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Foreign Labor Programs as an Alternative to Illegal
Immigration into the United States: A Dissenting View
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
1. Introduction
Illegal immigration into the United States has existed as an issue
since the attempts began to regulate entry were initiated in the 1880s.
It has, however, only become a prominent national issue since the 1960s.
With the annual number of apprehended illegal immigrants now totalling
over a million persons a year; with the number of non-apprehended illegal
immigrants far in excess of the number apprehended each year; and with
the accumulated stock of illegal immigrants estimated to be anywhere from
3 to 12 million persons (the 6-8 million person figures being the most com-
mon1y agreed upon range), it is obvious to all who care to know that the
existing immigration policy of the nation is in shambles. The causes of
the mounting public concern have not only been over the mounting numbers
of persons who enter illegally. It also derives from concern over the
impact that illegal immigrants have in the short run on employment and
income opportunities for citizen workers with whom they compete (most
notably minorities, women, and youth) and, for the long run, with the
creation and institutionalization of a permanent subclass of right1ess
persons within American society.
During the late 1960s and early 1970 there were numerous commission
reports, congressional hearings and academic writings which detailed
both the rising number of illegal immigrants and the incidious nature
2of the illegal immigration process on all parties. These efforts contributed
momentum to the movement for reform of the existing immigration system.
In August, 1977 the Carter Administration announced a set of reform pro-
posals. But despite the urgency of the President's request for action,
the Congressional response was authorization for the establishment of the
select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1978. The Commission
report is due in early 1981.
The appointment of the Commission to study the issue is, of course,
a standard political ploy to buy time. It gives the appearance of action
when, in fact, little of substance is occurring except talk. Generally
politicians create such commissions in the hope that by the time they
finish their work, the issue will have faded and no action will be needed.
But in this case, no one believes for a minute that illegal immigration
will recede as a domestic issue by the time the Commission issues its
final report. Hence, the essential rationale for the Commission's existence
is to allow more time for dialogue over appropriate policy alternatives.
The politicians were simply not yet ready to act on President Carter's
proposals and they had nothing better to suggest themselves. In addition,
most of the usual political coalitions are split over the appropriate
remedies to be applied (if any). Even within some groups (e.g., the
Chicano Community and the Catholic Church) there are deep internal divisions.
This issue has divided both liberals and conservatives. Time was required
for new coalitions to develop and a consensus over appropriate remedies to
be formed.
Among the many proposals that have been suggested is that there is a
need for some type of foreign worker program. The exact format of each
3proposal differ. Some call for expansion of the limited labor importation
programs that currently is in existence while others argue for programs
similar to those used in Europe since the end of World War II. It should
be noted in passing, however, that the Carter proposals did not include
such a recommendaton in its comprehensive package.
The objective of this paper is to outline the existing foreign worker
programs in the United States and to review critically the case against
ca 11i ng
those that now exist and those new proposals/for more such endeavors.
II. Past Foreign Worker Programs in the United States
Proposals for a foreign labor program are not new to the United States.
There have been several such programs in the past and there are several
that are ongoing at the present. Thus, if experience is a short cut to
education, there are lessons to be learned from looking at both the past
and the present before any evaluation is offered concerning the merits
and demerits of similar undertakings for the future.
The "First Bracero Program"
It is ironic that, only months after the United States enacted the
most restrictive immigration legislation in its history until that time--
the Immigration Act of 1917, the first foreign labor program was initiated.l
In response to strong pressure from the large agricultural employers of
the Southwest, Congress included in this very restrictive legislation
a provision which would allow entry of "temporary" workers who were "other-
wise inadmissible."2 The statute allowed the Secretary of Labor to exempt
such persons (Mexicans in this instance) from the head tax required of
each immigrant and the ban on any immigrants over age 16 who could not
4read. In May, 1917, such an order was issued for the creation of a
"temporary" farm worker program. Later it was expanded to allow some
Mexican workers to be employed in non-farm work. When the program was
announced, so were a number of rules and regulations to govern the
program. Ostensibly, tnese rules were designed to protect both citizen
workers and Mexican workers as well as to assure that the Mexicans
returned to Mexico after their work was completed. But, as has been
the historic pattern, "these elaborate rules were unenforced. 113
The "temporary" worker program was enacted during the period of World
War I. It was partially justified as being in the national defense.
This program, which Kiser and Kiser refer to as lithe first bracero program"
was extended until 1922 which was well after the war had ended in 1918.4
It was terminated because its rationale as a national defense policy could
no longer be justified; because organized labor contended that the program
undermined the economic welfare of citizen workers, and because many
people believed that there were no labor shortages but only greedy em-
ployers who wish to secure economic gains from being able to secure
cheap and compliant workers. During its lifespan, 76,862 Mexican workers
to the United States 5
were admitted/of which only 34,922 returned to Mexico.
The Second Bracero Program
With the advent of \~orld War II, the military requirements of the
United States and its related manufacturing needs led to charges that
another labor shortage existed in the agricultural sector. The fa rmers
of the Southwest had foreseen these developments before the Pearl Harbor
attack in 1941. They made two fateful decisions: first, the pool of
cheap labor in Mexico was to be tapped to fill the manpower deficit;
5second, the federal government was again to be the vehicle of de1iver-
ance.6
The initial requests of U.S. farmers for the establishment of a
contract labor program were denied by the federal government in 1941.
By mid-1942, however, the U.S. government had come to favor the program
but the government of Mexico balked at the prospect of a formal inter-
government agreement. The unregulated hiring of Mexican citizens by
foreign nations is prohibited by Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution
of 1917. Moreover, in the 1940s the Mexican economy was flourishing;
Mexican workers justifiably feared that they would be drafted; there were
bitter memories of the "repatriation drive" of the 1930s; and there was
knowledge of the discriminatory treatment accorded people of Mexican
ancestry throughout the Southwest at the time.
Negotiations between the bro governments, however, resulted in a
formal agreement, in August 1942. The Mexican Labor Program,
better known as the "bracero program, II was 1aunched. Mexican workers
were to be afforded numerous protections with respect to housing, trans-
portation, food, medical needs, and wage rates. Initiated through appro-
priations for P.L. 45, the program was extended by subsequent enactment
until 1947. Braceros were limited exclusively to agricultural work. Any
bracero who was found holding a job in any other industry was subject to
immediate deportation. When the agreement ended December 31, 1947, the
program was continued informally and unregulated until 1951. In that
year, under the guise of another war-related labor shortage, the bracero
program was revived by P.L. 78. This program continued to
function until it was unilaterally terminated by the United States on
6December 31, 1964.
The bracero program demonstrated precisely how border policies can
adversely affect citizen workers in the United States--especially, in
this case, the Chicanos who composed the bulk of the southwestern agri-
cultural labor force. Agricultural employment in the Southwest was re-
moved from competition with the non-agricultural sector. At its peak,
almost one-half million braceros were working in the agricultural labor
market of the Southwest. The availability of Mexican workers signifi-
cantly depressed existing wage levels in some regions; modulated wage
increases that would have occurred in its absence in all other regions;
and sharply compressed the duration of employment for which many citizen
farm workers could find jobs.7 Citizen farmworkers simply could not
compete with braceros. The fact that braceros were captive workers who
were totally subject to the unilateral demands of employers made them
especially appealing to many employers. The bracero program was a sig-
nificant factor in the rapid exodus of rural Chicanos to urban labor
markets between 1950 and 1970 where they were poorly prepared to find
h . 8employment and ouslng.
A lasting effect of the second bracero program was that it exposed
hundred of thousands of penniless Mexican workers to the wide array of
economic opportunities as well as the higher wages and benefits that were
available in the United States economy. It is not surprising that both
paralleling the bracero years and immediately following its termination in
1964 has been the accelerated growth in the number of illegal immigrants.
Many thousands of these illegal aliens were former braceros. They had
7been attracted to the Mexican border towns from the rural interior of
central and northern Mexico by the existence of the contract labor pro-
gram. To this degree, there is an element of truth to the proposition
that th~ United States itself has created the illegal alien problem.
By the same token, however, it is grossly simplistic to conclude that
the problem would not eventually have surfaced in the absence of the
bracero program. The existence of the vast economic differences be-
tween the two national economies are simply too great.
III. Present Foreign Worker Programs in the United States
As the bracero programs are no longer operational, it is instructive
to review some of the prevailing policies that permit workers who live in
other countries to be employed in the United States. From these experiences
it is possible to deduce some of the effects of the new proposals for
foreign worker programs.
Border Commuters
Border commuters are a sub group of a larger immigration classification
known as resident aliens. A resident alien is a foreign born national who
applies for permission to live and to work in the United States on a
permanent basis. They can retain their own original foreign citizenship.
After a period of five years, they may apply anytime to become citizens
or they can remain a resident alien indefinitely. A substantial number
of resident aliens never elect to become naturalized citizens.
All resident aliens are issued a card from the INS that is officially
8known as an 1-151 card. In 1975, there were 4.2 million resident aliens
registered with the INS.9 Over 75 percent of them reside in eight states
with California, New York and Texas accounting for 49 percent of the total.
Persons from Mexico are by far the most numerous of this group--numbering
868,198 (or 21 percent) of the total in 1975. Over 75 percent of all
resident aliens from Mexico reside in California and Texas. There is no
data available that actually tells how many resident aliens actually reside
in the border region but it can safely be said that there are many.
There are two types of resident aliens. One is the larger group of
resident aliens who live and who work on a permanent basis in the United
States. The other resident alien group works regularly in the United
States but resides permanently in either Mexico or Canada. This latter
group are called "commuters" or, more commonly, "green carders" (so named
because they must show their 1-151 cards each time they cross the border
and it was originally green in color; it is now blue). Thus, the important
distinction is this: all commuters are "green carders" but most
"green carders" are not corrmuters.
At the risk of becoming too confusing, it should be noted that there
are also two types of commuting "green carders." One is the commuter who
crosses the border on a daily basis. The other is the person who works in
the U.S. on a seasonal basis. Generally speaking, the daily commuter is
the one whose presence is felt in the along border economy of the U.S.--
especially the southern border. The seasonal commuter generally moves
much further inland and only returns to his home in Mexico during the
off-season of the industry in which he or she is employed. The impact of
the seasonal commuter--who may be employed in construction, or farming,
9or a tourist industry--is diluted due to the fact that they are employed
in jobs scattered allover the nation. The daily commuters, on the other
hand, are much more concentrated. Accordingly, they are highly signifi-
cant in their local labor market impact. David North has aptly observed
that the daily "commuter is this generation's bracero."l0
Due to the extreme differences in the stages of economic development
betwen Mexico and the United States, commuters from Mexico are often
willing to work for wages and under employment conditions that are im-
possible for a person who must confront the daily cost of living in the
United States on a permanent basis. The commuter has a real income ad-
vantage. Also commuters often act as strikebreakers in labor disputes
along the border and, accordingly, are one factor that explains the
fewness of unions in the region. A study in 1970 placed the number of
daily commuters from Mexico at 70,000 persons.11 This would mean that
roughly one out of every 11 persons employed in 1970 in the U.S. counties
along the border were commuters. Obviously, a work force of this magnitude
exerts a tremendous impact on these U.S. border communites. Unofficial
estimates (there are no official estimates) from INS of the number of
daily border commuters in 1978 placed the figure at about 100,000 persons .12
Due to the unfair real income advantage that the commuter worker has
over the resident worker of the U.S. in the competition for jobs, the
legitimacy of their status has been a continuing source of dispute. To
understand the nature of this long controversy, it is necessary to under-
stand the evolution of the commuter phenomenon.
Prior to 1917, there were virtually no restrictions placed on immi-
grants (except those from Asia) who wished to work in the United States.
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In 1917 and 1921, temporary restrictions were imposed on immigration and,
shortly afterwards, the Immigration Act of 1924 established the first
numerical restrictions on immigration. Persons from the Western Hemi-
sphere, however, were not included in the provisions of the Act which
required all people entering the United States to be classified as either
lIimmigrantsll or IInon-immigrants.1I 1/ Immi grants II were defi ned as all
entrants except those designated as IInon-immigrantsll who are visiting the
country temporarily IIfor business or pleasure. II For a short interval,
workers who lived in Mexico but commuted to jobs in the United States were
classified as IInon-immigrant visitorsll who were free to cross the border
IIfor bus i ness . II By arbitrary administrative decision of the INS in 1927,
however, the status of these people was changed to lIimmigrants.1I Sub-
sequently, in 1929, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the INS decision, with
the famous ruling that lIemployment equals residencell (thereby neatly
avoiding the permanent residency requirement of the immigration statutes).13
There are, however, several differences between a IIgreen carderll and
other permanent res ident immigrants. IIGreen cardersll may not be unemployed
for more than six months without losing their immigration classification;
they may not serve as strikebreakers; and they cannot count the time they
live outside the United States toward the five years needed to be eligible
to apply for permanent citizenship. In reality these differences are of
absolutely no consequence. The unemployment restriction is not enforced;
the anti-strikebreaker rule is so easily circumvented that it is essentially
meaningless; and many IIgreen cardersll have absolutely no interest in
becoming American citizens.
Surprisingly, the question as to whether or not a IIgreen carderll
11
must reside in the United States has been the subject of extensive contro-
versy. For over the years, the immigration statutes have changed consider-
Since the Immigration Act of 1965 was passed, it has been chargedably.
that the prevailing law actually forbids the practice of commuting since
the re-entry rights of a resident alien are limited to a person who is
IIreturning to an unrelinquished lawful permanent address.1I14 Before 1965,
the INS reasoned that any commuter who had been accorded the "pri vi lege
of resi ding permanently II was always entitled to enter the country. The
Immigration Act of 1965, however, altered the previous statutory language.
The amended language restricted informal entry to "an immigrant lawfully
admitted for permanent residence who is returning from a temporary visit
aborad. II
Accordingly, one legal scholar has concluded: "No distortion of the
English language could result in a finding that the commuter was entering
the United States after a temporary visit abroad to return to his principal,
actual dwelling place. Rather, the commuter was simply leaving this foreign
15home and entering the United States to work. II He argued that since 1965
the status of border commuters is "not merely lacking in statutory author-
ity" but that the practice is "actually prohibited. II
In November 1974, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the afore-
mentioned logic by upholding the INS position that daily and seasonal
commuters are lawful permanent residents returning from temporary absences
abroad.16 Essentially, the Court said that it was not going to overthrow
50 years of administrative practices by judicial decree. If the Congress
wishes to outlaw the practice of border commuting, it will have to act in
a specific legislative manner.
12
It is worthy of note that the u.s. Department of State has consistently
contended that any interruption in the commuter program would seriously
harm relations between Mexico and the United States. Former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk testified before Congress that the border towns of the two
nations IIhave grown into single economic communities" and that "a disruption
in the life of these communities would do real harm to good neighbor rela-
tions in the area."l? Nevertheless, the sanction given to commuters means
that the citizen workers of the border region must compete directly with
these commuters. As one noted labor market analyst has observed:
The United States worker who competes with the
traffic of workers from Mexico is caught in a situa-
tion where he pays a substantial part of what the
Secretary of State regards as a form of foreign aid
to a neighboring nation.18
It is true, of course, that these resident aliens who commute could
simply move across the border and live in the United States at will.
this sense, they are not truly foreign workers as the term is usually
In
applied. But as long as they do not reside in the United States, they
function in a capacity that is identical to being foreign workers. They
enjoy the real income benefits of living in Mexico while working in the
United States. This gives them an advantage over citizen workers who must
compete with them for the identical job opportunities. In reality, the commuters
have no intention at all of becoming U.S. citizens. They are only availing
themselves of a loophole in U.S. immigration policy that adversely affects
citizen workers.
"Visitor Workers"
There is another more pernicious system of commuting workers whose
status, unlike commuting IIgreen carders," is not debateable. It is simply
.13
illegal. Nonetheless, they pass through the legal checkpoints by the
thousands each day to jobs in border towns of the United States, They
are not citizens of the United States nor have they any claim to citizen-
ships. For lack of a better name, they can be called "visitor workers."
They do constitute a foreign worker program although they are never dis-
cussed as such.
The phenomenon of "visitor workers" arises because citizens of Mexico who
live permanently in Mexican border towns are accorded special passage
privileges to enter the United States at will. The only travel restric-
tion is that they must remain within a prescribed distance of the border.
These Mexican citizens request an 1-186 card from the INS. Thes e ca rds
are white and, as one can imagine, the bearers are known as "white carders."
The 1-186 card is for persons known as "legal visitors" or "border crossers."
Technically, the bearer of the card can remain in the U.S. for up to 72
hours on any single visit. The bearer of the card is restricted to a
radius of 25 miles of the border. The holder of an 1-186 card, however,
is specifically forbidden from seeking employment or being employed any-
where in the United States.
In fact, however, there is little to stop a "white carder" from work-
ing and many do. Prior to January 1, 1969, a white card was valid for
only four years. Since that time, however, the cards are no longer dated.
As a result, no expiration appears on the card. The INS claimed that the
renewal procedures were too time consuming and costly. As can be imagined,
the result is that many Mexican citizens regularly cross the border to
. t 19 G.work withi n the border penme er. lVen the immense number of people
who cross the border check points each day as well as the pressure to
14
expedite the flow, little can be done by INS off1cials to police the
prohibition against working that is supposedly a condition for receipt
of the 1-186 card.
Although "visitor workers" are a well known factor to all familiar
with the border region, they are the least mentioned and the least
studied. Typically these persons are day workers or live-in workers in
casual occupations. It is not uncommon for lower-middle income families
to have maids in many border cities.20 As "visitor workers" are illegally
employed, they seldom complain about the wages and working conditions.
As most of these persons are women with families on the Mexican side of
the border, they are greatly restricted in the geographical area in which
they work.
The women crowd into occupations that are already in surplus in the
local labor market. Although the "visitor worker" is a small component
of the daily number of persons who cross the border, it is likely that
they still constitute a significant number of persons in the occupations
in which they work.
Exactly how many "white carders" there are is a mystery. The INS
reports that over 2.2 million cards were issued in the Southwest region
between 1960 and 1969.21 There is no estimate of how many have been
issued since then except for the fact that the number each year is in the
"tens of thousands." Howmany of these "white carders" have abused their
visiting privileges by seeking employment is unknown. The fact that the
statistics of "green and white carders" are either vague or completely
15
unknown was labeled "astonishing" by the comprehensive UCLA Mexican-
American Study Project conducted in 1970.22
In passing, it should also be noted that the "white card" is also
a popular device for illegal immigrants to use to cross the border.
Having entered the United States, it is often the case that the card is
simply mailed back to Mexico and the person then moves further north out-
side the 25 miles zone. This avoids the possibility that the card might
be confiscated if the bearer is apprehended. In this event, the person simply
indicates that he or she is an illegal immigrant and wishes a voluntary
departure back to Mexico. There the original white card is waiting for
use again.
H-2 Workers
In 1952, the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act author-
ized the Attorney General of the United States, acting through the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Commission of the U.S. Department of Justice to
admit non-immigrant persons for temporary jobs "if unemployed persons
capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this
country.,,23 This was section H-2 of the Act and, accordingly, the program
itself is popularly referred to as the H-2 program. The U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) has the responsibility for the decision as to whether
citizen workers are actually available. In making its determination, DOL
has devised a system of adverse wage rates and working conditions. These
wage rates and working conditions must be provided by any employer who
seeks to hire foreign workers under the H-2 program. The purpose of
the requirements is to avoid the chances that the program will depress
existing work standards. The final entry decision, however, resides with
16
the Department of Justice. Hence, it does happen on occasion that the
Department of Labor is overruled. The size of the H-2 program has
fluctuated widely. From a high of 69,000 in 1970, it has declined to
about 23,000 in 1978.
As of the period 1978-1979, there have been four rural industries
that have been the primary users of H-2 workers.24 These are the sugar
cane industry in Florida (using Jamaicans); apple industry in a number of
eastern states (using Jamaicans); the woodcutting industry in Maine
(using Canadians); and sheepherding (using Peruvians and Mexicans).
There have been several minor programs involving row crop harvesting in
recent years in which Mexican workers have been admitted as H-2 workers.
Although all of these users of H-2 workers may seem to be rather in-
cidental industries, they all have very powerful political and influential
political lobbies as the Department of Labor has regularly found out to
" t
. f t 251 S mls or une.
The H-2 program incorporates all of the undesireable features of
the aforementioned bracero program. The workers are totally dependent
upon the employers. El i gi bil i ty to be chosen for the program depends
upon one's contacts with certain officials of his government. It is
often considered a privilege to be selected. If chosen, the worker can
only be assured of the opportunity to return again if his work and
attitude please the American employer. This is because the employee
may "request by name" a set proportion (usually 50 percent) of this
year1s H-2 workers to return the next year. In effect, this means that
the workers must compete with one another on terms that are very favor-
able to the employer. If any part of the worker1s demeanor or work
17
unsatisfacotry to the employer, the worker may be deported at anytime
without an appeal. Given this system, Martin and North conclude "it is
little wonder that H-2 aliens are 'hard working and diligent. 11,26
IV. Proposals for New Foreign Worker Programs for the United States
In addition to the previously discussed forms of foreign worker
programs, there are, of course, the millions of illegal iJTl11igrants who
work in the United States.
albeit totally unregulated.
They do constitute a foreign labor program
Officially, of course, illegal immigrants
are unsanctioned but, because the immigration policy of the United
States is so blatently tolerant of their presence, it can be argued that
they are unofficially both condoned by the government and welcomed by
many employers. Certainly, any nation that has a policy that places no
penalties on employers for hiring illegal immigrants; that gives voluntary
departures back to their homelands of 95 percent of those who are appre-
hended; and which has an iJTl11igration enforcement agency that is chroni-
cally underfunded and understaffed, can hardly be taken seriously in its
claims to oppose illegal entry.
But because of the mounting number of persons tnvolved and because
of the inherent danger both to the illegal immigrants themselves and
to the nation as a whole of suc~ an assemblage of rightless persons in
its midst, the Carter Administration di~ offer a comprehensive set of
reforms in 1977. As indicated earlier, the Carter proposals did not
include any recommendations for a foreign worker program as a potential
remedy. Nonetheless, a number of such proposals h~ve been offered by
It is also known that the Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policyothers.
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is pondering such recommendation. Before examining the effects of such a
conceptual approach, it would be useful to review a sampling of these
proposals.
One proposal is an attempt to draw from the years experience of
Western Europe with foreign worker programs. It has been suggested by
W. R. Bohning.27 Addressing ~ illegal immigrants from Mexico, he
says that the United States has a demand for unskilled workers because
they are "cheap and industrious."28 He argues that illegal immigrants
are "not a marginal element of the United States labour market" but that
"they are necessary for the smooth functi oni ng of the economy as it exi sts
29today. II In fact, he alleges that there is a "genuine demand" for their
work.
Under the Bohning Plan, a Mexican worker--called an "undocumentado"--
could get a visa to cross the border and look for a job anywhere just as if
he or she were a citizen worker. The worker has three months to find a
job. If a job is found, the worker requests a contract for up to 12 months.
At the end of the period, the contract could be renewed, lion the spot. II If
the "undocumentado" can only find seasonal contract work, he or she must
return to Mexico but could be requested by name the following year. Ifa
Mexican cannot find work after three months or for a full season, he or
she must return to Mexico. Otherwise, they are subject t~ deportation.
When they return to Mexico, they then must compete with all other Mexican
workers to get back on the list of visa eligibles. Essentially, the program
would work like a union hiring hall similar to that used in the construction
and longshoring industries where casual employment is a key employment
feature. There is no indication given as to how a person would be selected
to become an undocumentado.
19
While in the country, the "undocumentados" would be accorded all
economic and social rights. No seasonal "undocumentados" could bring
their families after the first contract renewal. After five years of
continuous residence, the "undocumentado" could apply for permanent resident
alien status. No other changes in the existing immigration system are
suggested.
Another proposal for "a temporary labor program" has been made by
Charles Keely.3D His program would permit foreign workers to be employed
"in regions and sections" identified by the U.S. Department of Labor "as
in need of labor.,,31 The decision would be made after consultation with
both employers and labor unions. Temporary workers could be granted immi-
grant status (i .e., become a resident al ien) if they could find work for
some set period of time (he suggests a work duration of from 15 to 25 consecutive
months). The basis of the plan is that "if a worker worked here, he could
build up some rights to settle.,,32 Family members would be able to
accompany the temporary immigrants and would be entitled to all social
programs available to citizen workers. Keely does condition his proposal
with additional recommendations for enforcement of existing labor law~
and sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants.
A third proposal pertains to the existing H-2 program. It is associated
with work done by Edwin Reubens.33 Actually he sets forth two possible new
variants of an expanded foreign worker program: "a new H-2 program" and
"an improved H-2 program. II With regard to the "new" H-2 program, he
suggests the possibility of enlarging the existing program "in certain
jobs" for periods one year with renewals of up to three years. After this
period the H-2 holder would have to leave the country and join the pool
20
of job seekers back in his or her country. The next cohort of job seekers
would not be admitted until the preceeding group returned as scheduled.
The three year period is designed to overcome the fear of labor unions
that short term workers are hard to unionize. The prolonged stay is
also intended to encourage the foreign workers to join unions and to
develop a commitment to the job.
Reubens also suggests that the new H-2 program be limited to the
expansion of jobs "to those jobs of low skill, low paid work which
currently are often filled by undocumented aliens and are not very
attractive to American unemployed workers. ,,34 He argues that this has
been the focus of the guestworker programs of Western Europe. He states
that the complaints about these guestworker programs in Europe have been
more related "to local social pressures and disparities than to any under-
cutting of wages or working conditions. ,,35 Hence, it would be wise to
avoid the social pressures by excluding all dependents of the foreign
workers. This requirement, he suggests, should be made clear to all
applicants for H-2 permits and those who cannot accept this deprivation
"should not volunteer for the program.,,36 Furthermore, he suggests that
the U.S. Department of Labor should "conduct an outreach program in the
source countries" to "ensure that appropriate types and numbers of persons
are recruited" that will "meet the actual needs of U.S. labor markets. ,,37
The wage rates would be set by the U.S. Department of Labor to be at
"comparative wage minimums" to those paid to domestic workers. As such,
these established rates could be used to "sustain present labor standards"
and they could be gradually raised in order to be attractive to more
citi zen workers.
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Reubens does state that, if this proposal is intended to absorb
the jobs currently held by undocumented aliens, it would have to enroll
"hundreds of thousands II of H-2 holders a year.38 This he notes could
easily overburden the existing administrative capability of the appro-
priate government agencies if any sizable number of persons elected not to
go as scheduled. The thrust of his proposal is designed for workers from
Mexico although he does not explicitly restrict it to them.
A second option offered by Reubens is to simply improve the existing
program. This proposal would keep the program to its present small level
of magnitude but improve the existing procedures for recruiting citizen
workers before relying upon H-2 workers (by establishing better job informa-
tion channels, upgrading existing jobs, enhanced mobility, and providing
more training) and to tighten the existing certification processes for
occupations and industries in need of H-2 workers.
Somewhat parenthetically, Reubens adds that along the Mexican-United
States border, lithe need for low level workers at certain times of the
year" could be more easily met by simply making it easier to secure "green
cards" for daily crossers.39 Obviously, Reubens does not understand that
a "green card" holder is a resident alien. As discussed earlier, when
such a card is issued, the bearer is entitled to hold the card forever
and even to become a citizen after five years. It certainly is a funda-
mental error to talk about "green cards" as a means of meeting seasonal
labor needs.
The Reubens proposal was prepared for the National Commission for
Manpower Policy. After considering the proposal, the Chairman of this
Commission, Professor Eli Ginzburg, wrote to the Secretary of Labor that
he advised "strongly against" any expanded H-2 program.40
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V Criticisms of A New Foreign Worker Program
By commonagreement of all of the literature, the effect of the
presence of illegal immigrants is disproportionately felt in the low
wage labor markets of the United States. Most of the illegal immigrants
--especially those from Mexico and the Caribbean area--are themselves
poorly skilled, poorly educated, and have language restrictions. Even
those persons without these characteristics are often downgraded into
the same labor market due to their fear of exposure or their inability
to produce records of their proper credentials.
It is not necessary to knit-pick the deficiencies of the afore-
mentioned proposals for a new-foreign labor program. Obviously all of
them are simply conceptual sketches. None of them have scratched the
surface of such critical issues as how the workers are recruited; what
are their job entitlements; what are the limitations to be placed on
employer perrogatives to limit exploitation; what tests are to be used to
test for job certification; and what protections are to be included for
citizen workers and for unions to assure that prevailing standards are
not undermined. Moreover none of them even remotely touch the fact that
the INS is in a current state of total administrative chaos.4l The INS
cannot handle the paperwork associated with the legal immigration system--
not even to mention illegal immigrants. It is inconceivable that INS
could administer a new foreign worker program. All of these matters
must, of course, be settled long before such a foreign worker program is
initiated. But to anyone familar with the history of regulatory efforts
associated with the H-2 programs, the bracero programs, and the various
border commuter systems knows that the task will be--to put it midly--
formidable.
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Putting aside these administrative matters, the major criticisms of
forei gn worker prog rams are thei r conceptua 1 des i gn, thei r impact, and thei r
magnitude. All of these considerations are sufficiently serious enough
to counter any alleged merits that they might have.
The rationale for proposals for new foreign worker programs is the
existence of illegal entry on a massive scale. It is nut based on the
existence of demonstrated need. Unemployment rates in the United States
are the highest of any of the Western industrialized nations. Moreover,
the unemployment rates among Hispanics, blacks, women, and youth far exceed
the national aggregate unemployment rates. All of the proposals (as well
as the existing foreign worker programs discussed earlier) are designed ex-
clusively for recruiting more workers for the unskilled and semi-skilled
occupations in primarily low wage industries. These are precisely the
same secondary labor market jobs in which those citizen workers with the
highest unemployment rates are already found. No one is suggesting that
there be a foreign worker program to supply more doctors, professors,
lawyers, or business executives. For not only would such proposals lead
to charges of a "brain drain" from emerging nations, but, also the
domestic opposition of these privileged and protected workers in the
primary labor market could be counted upon to kill any such idea at the
moment of its conception. Rather, it is because it is a program that may
benefit the privileged but which will adversely affect opportunities for
the less fortunate and the least politically organized groups in American
society that such proposals are put forth.
worker program is clearly class biased.
The proposal for a foreign
There is no evidence at all that citizen workers will not do the work
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that illegal immigrants now do. It is alleged, without one shred of em~
pirical evidence in the works of Piore, Cornelius, and Bohning, to
mention only a few, that this is the case.42 But none of these works cite
a single occupation or industry in which they can contend that the vast
majority of workers in the same occupations are not U.S. citizens.
Hence, it cannot be the ~ of work that makes illegal immigrants
attractive. Rather, it is the wage rates and working conditions that
determine worker availability. Studies can show selected labor markets
in which illegal immigrants have made a collective impact on certain occupa-
tions and certain industries. They can find employers who hire illegal
immigrants and who contend that U.S. citizens are increasingly difficult
to find. But it is just as valid as a counter argument to say that it is
precisely because of the presence of sizeable numbers of illegal immigrants
that citizen workers are more difficult to recruit. In other words, these
employer arguments are a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is because illegal
immigrants crowd into certain industries that citizen workers are forced
to withdraw. No citizen worker can compete with illegal immigrants when
the ground rules are who will work for the least pay and under the most
arbitrary types of employment. Yet it is exactly for these same occupa-
tions and industries that foreign worker programs would be designed to
supply additional workers.
As every economist knows, it is impossible to separate the employment
effects from the wage effects whenever there is a change in the supply of
labor.43 Hence, the presence of foreign workers would not only affect job
opportunities but also affect wage levels. It is the wage effects that are
part of the attractiveness of illegal immigrants to American employers.
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These employers are able to obtain workers at less cost than would be the
case in their absence. This does not mean that most employers exploit
these workers by paying wages below the federal minimum wage. Obviously,
some malevolent employers do pay lower than legal wages but this is clearly
the exception in the present era. Available research shows that most
illegal immigrants do receive at least the federal minimum wage and many
receive much more.44 A foreign worker program, therefore, would not serve
as a means of raising wages to the established federal wage floor since
most illegal immigrants are already at that level or beyond. Rather, its
presence would modulate against pressures for wages to increase in the low
wage labor over time.
Most of the wage exploitation that occurs at present is simply the
result of the fact that illegal immigrants are available at wage rates that
are lower than would be the case if the same employers had to hire only
citizen workers. This situation, of course, can only be exacerbated by
the additional supply of foreign workers. This is exactly the impact that
the braceros had in the past. The thorough report on the bracero program
by the President's Commission on Migratory Labor found that for agricultural
workers "that wages by States were inversely related to the supply of alien
labor."45 Likewise North's comprehensive study of the commuters found that
the minimum wage was essentially the prevailing wage for most commuters.46
As the border region contains the three poorest standard metropolitan
statistical areas in the country (Brownsville, McAllen and El Paso) plus
the fact that the employment rates all along the border are consistently
in double digits and labor force participation rates (especially among
women) are among the lowest in the nation, it is obvious what the employment
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and wage effects of a foreign worker program will be upon citizen workers
in the secondary labor market.
But the real case for exploitation is derived from the fact that
foreign workers can be expected to be docile workers. Citizen workers
know that they have job entitlements. These entitlements include minimum
wage protection but extend into a number of other areas such as overtime
pay provisions, safety requirements, equal employment opportunity pro-
tection, and collective bargaining rights. It is these additional employee
entitlements than an employer can often escape if foreign workers are
available. For technically even though foreign workers (and illegal
immigrants too for that matter) may be covered by these work standards,
their presence creates a situation in which these safeguards cannot be
guaranteed in practice. For the enforcement mechanisms for most of these
laws are based largely upon employee complaints or actions. It is highly
unlikely that foreign workers will know their rights. Even if they are so
knowledgeable, they will probably be reluctant to do anything about abuses
for fear of losing their jobs and, relative to the jobs alternatives
available in their native lands, they may not even perceive the violations
are being exploitive.
As for unionization~ the occupations in which illegal immigrants
and commuters are concentrated are rareiy unionized at present. The avail-
ability of foreign workers will virtually guarantee that unionization will
not occur in these labor markets. Hence, a foreign worker program would
definitely function as an anti-union device.
Thus even if the wage rates that an employer must pay are identical
for foreign workers and for citizen workers, the foreign workers will be
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preferred. It is the knowledge that foreign workers will be less likely
to make demands for job rights or to join unions that will make them
highly prized. Thus, it is the non-economic factors that will provide
the crucial advantages for employers as they now do for the employment
of illegal immigrants.
Another flaw in these proposals is their intended magnitude. The
only way that a foreign worker program can do anything to reduce illegal
immigration is if the program is significant in size (at least in the
500,000 to 750,000 person range). But the larger the program, the
greater the certainty of adverse impact on citizens. On the other hand,
if the scale of the program is small then where will be the deterrance to
illegal entry? There must be some limitation on the size of the program
and, if there is, what will stop others who are not selected or whose
period of work has expired but they wish to remain from either coming or
remaining? All of the unresolved features of the present system would remain
issues (i.e., employer sanctions, the proper identification question, amnesty,
the use of the voluntary departure system, and the budget and manpower de-
ficiencies of the INS). A foreign worker program does not resolve any
of the current policy issues but it certainly adds a host of new ones.
Certainly, no move should be made to even consider a foreign worker program
until all of the ancillary questions are settled.
Also, all of the discussions of the foreign worker option assume
either implicitly or explicitly that the program would be a bilateral
arrangement with Mexico. This has certainly been true of past experience.
But times have changed in both Mexico and the United States. Indeed, it
is no accident that the momentum for immigration reform began in the 1960's
and 1970's when there was heightened domestic interest in civil rights and
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the eradication of poverty.47 The point is that illegal immigrants are
streaming into the United States from almost every country in the world.
President Carter's message that accompanied his immigration proposals
stated there were 60 countries that are "regular" sources of illegal
immigration.48 For although about 90 percent of the illegal immigrants
who are annually apprehended are from Mexico, this is merely the result
of the concentration of INS apprehension techniques on undocumented
entrants in the Southwest. It is doubtful if Mexicans compose as much
as 60 percent of the total stock of illegal immigrants in the United
States. There are millions of other illegal immigrants who are not
Mexicans. Generally they enter the country with proper documents but they
overstay their visas. Many of these people face economic deprivation and
political persecution situations that are worse than those conditions
confronting Mexicans. In fact, compared to many other countries in the
Carribbean, Central America, and South America, life in Mexico is con-
siderably better.49 Many of these countries in the Caribbean--as Hiati,
the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad--have large black
populations. All of them--and others that could be cited--are regular
sources of "vi sa abusers II. In many instances the question is not why do
so many of them seek entry into the United States but, rather, why do any
of them stay behind given the bleak futures that confront them. The same
can be said of Asians from Hong Kong, Korea, the Phillipines, and Singa-
pore which are also major sources of illegal immigration. Hence, it is
very unlikely that any foreign worker program could be restricted to
workers from Mexico. If it was, it would mean that it would be a racist
proposal and it would also mean that it would have nothing to offer as a
solution to illegal entry from other nations of the world. Thus, the
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scale of such proposals is again an issue.
In addition, the proposals for a foreign worker program simply
neglect all of the experience that the United States has had (as well as
in many cases in Europe) _with foreign worker programs. Namely, when
workers come from economically less developed countries to a country like
the United States, they are made aware of opportunities that for many is
beyond their wildest imagination. The relatively higher wages and the
broader array of job opportunities will create, as they have in the past,
a tendency for many to remain. It also sets up a situation in which
children are born and marriages occur. Both of these actions involve
potential claims for citizenship. In the United States, with its multi-
racial and multi-ethnic group propulation, it is far more likely that
these pressures will occur than would ever be true in Europe. Rather
than reduce the costs of uncontrolled immigration to American society, a
foreign worker program will only add to the problem.
VI. Concluding Observations
H. L. Mencken once quipped that "for every complex problem there is
a lways a simp 1e answer--and it i s always wrong." Proposals for a new
foreign worker program are no answer to the complex problem of illegal
immigration. To be effective, it would have to be substantial in size;
but if it were substantial in size, it would clearly have an adverse impact on
segments of the domestic labor force. Furthermore, even if it were conceptually
feasible, the INS as it is now staffed and budgeted is totally incapable of
adm,ini s teri ng any such a prog ram without it becoming a fi as co. It is
also very doubtful that the Deparment of Labor could handle such a program.
A foreign worker program would undoubtedly increase illegal
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immigration by exposing more foreign workers to the economic attractions
of the American labor market. It would also adversely affect job and in-
come opportunities for many persons in the American economy who have the
least capability of defending themselves from their competition. It is
not surprising, therefore, that a 1979 conference on IIJobs for
Hispanicsll--sponsored by the Labor Council for Latin Americ~p Advancement
,>;
and attended by both Hispanic trade unionists and Hispanic community
groups from across the country--took a strong and unanimous stand against
a foreign worker program. In their conference manifesto, called the
IIDeclaration of Albuquerque," they called for a number of policy changes
that would be beneficial and protective of illegal immigrants. But with
respect to the idea of allguest workerllprogram, they emphatically stated:
The federal government should not include any
type of I Bracero I program or foreign labor
importation, as a solution to the current
problem of undocumented workers.50
Foreign worker programs are only of interest to employers as a means
of either reducing their costs of production or of enhancing employer con-
trol over their workers.51 Foreign workers are attractive only because
of their dependency upon their employers. Citizen workers who compete
with foreign workers will find, as in the past, that their existing work
conditions either become frozen or decline but under few circumstances
will they improve. Efforts to establish unions are thwarted or, at a
minimum, made more difficult. These callous motivations should not be
rewarded.
A foreign worker program will in no way diminish the need to reform
the existing immigration system of the United States. Until the system
is made capable of accomplishing its stated goals of regulating the flow
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of immigrants into the United States, illegal immigration will flourish
regardless of the existence of a foreign worker program. But if such a
program was enacted, it might deceive some people into thinking that an
answer has been provided. Indeed, a foreign worker program has great
political attractiveness just because it gives the appearance of being
a remedy while avoiding the necessity of taking the hard actions that
are mandatory to the achievement of an end to illegal immigration.
In 1979, the United States admitted over 600,000 legal immigrants.
This is a commendable attribute of American society. For not only does
the number exceed the total legal immigrants admitted by all of the
remaining nations of the world combined, but also they .were admitted
on a totally non-discriminatory basis. This accomplishment should not
be allowed to be tarnished by the continued flow of millions of other
persons who have flaunted the legal system by entering illegally. The
proposals for a foreign worker program must be recognized as being simply
a placebo. They offer an imaginary remedy to a real problem. But such
an idea is not neutral in its long term effects since it can only make
an already bad situation much worse. What is offered as a tonic is
actually a toxic.
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